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Distinguished Speakers at Seidtnall
Robert Lund, Senior Vice President of
Marketing at General Motors, spoke to
students, faculty, and staff Thursday,
November 15. His topic was "The Leadership
Role of the United States in Automotive
Marketing." He also met over lunch that day
with fifteen Seidman School Affiliates to
discuss domestic automotive production and
the Michigan economy.

Dr. Steven Skancke, former Staff Director
of the White House Conference on Produc
tivity and Deputy Counselor to the Secretary
of the Treasury, spoke to students, faculty,
and staff Wednesday, December 5. His topic
was "Profits and Productivity: Recipes for
Success." He met with Seidman faculty at a
luncheon to explore a number of productiv
ity issues. Dr. Skancke is Vice President of G.
Wilham Miller and Company.

Dr. James Buchanan, Director of the
Center for the Study of Public Choice at

George Mason University, was in Grand
Rapids and on campus on Thursday, April
18. He spoke to west Michigan area econo
mists at a breakfast meeting, to the Seidman
School Affiliates at lunch, and to the Grand
Valley students, faculty, and staff in the after
noon. His topic at the luncheon meeting was
"Federal Deficits and the Ethics of Default,"
and his speech on campus was entitled "Public
Choice Perspectives and the Ethics of De
fault." Dr. Buchanan's many publications
include The Economics of Politics, The
Calculus of Consent, and Fairness, Hope,
and Justice.

L. William Seidman, Dean of the School
of Business at Arizona State University, spoke
to students, faculty, and staff Thursday, April
25. His topic was "Productivity and Quality
in the United States." Mr. Seidman served as
Economic Policy Coordinator for President
Gerald R. Ford from 1973 to 1976 and as
Executive Vice President for Phelps Dodge
Corporation from 1976 to 1981.

L. William Seidman

Barter Clubs and Exchanges: A New Source
of Inefficiency and Risk
continued from page 1

These possibilities mean that additional
costs might have to be incurred to reduce de
fault risk. Potential members may have to in
vestigate the exchange and its operators and
their track records and credit standing. Thus,
as transactions costs are lowered by reducing
the double coincidence of wants, other costs
and risks are higher. But, whatever the mix
of costs incurred and risks taken, their total
is higher with barter than with the use of con
ventional money.
It should be noted that the units or points
produced by barter groups are an attempt to
create another kind of money-an inferior
one at that. The use of this "money" is limited
to the members of the barter group, of course.
It has no acceptability outside the group.
In effect, barter organizations are an in
between case, between straight barter, on the
one hand, and the use of money, on the
other. They issue a form of money but a
limited one.

Inefficiency in Supply
And Demand
Another source of inefficiency with barter
ing is that the prices at which trades take place
are not necessarily equal to the "equilibrium"
price. This occurs because of the limited
market for bartered goods and services,
whether that stems from the double coin

cidence of wants or the limited number of
trading partners in barter organizations.
At this point, you will realize that even
though goods and services may be bartered,
they are traded at "prices." The price of a
good or service in a trade is how much of
something else is given up for it. A price is
an "exchange ratio." For example, if three
chickens are traded for one pig, the exchange
ratio (the price) of pigs in terms of chickens
is three, and the price of chicken in terms of
pigs is one-third.
The equilibrium price (Pe ) at any particular
time is the price. that balances the supply of
the goods or services being traded with their
demand. Consider widgets as the good be
ing traded in a competitive market. Pe is the
equilibrium price of widgets. At Pe , the
number of Widgets demanders want is equal
to the amount of widgets offered for sale. At
Pe , there are no Widgets left over and there
are no unsatisfied demanders who are will
ing to pay Pe . Pe could be thought of as the
"true" price of widgets. The higher the pro
portion of transactions that take place at Pe,
the more perfect the market. However, the
more transactions that take place away from
Pe , the more imperfect the market.
In barter, the source of this market imper
fection and inefficiency is the fact that markets
for bartered goods are much smaller than
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those for the identical goods bought and sold
in regular markets with money Consider a
combined market for widgets in which most
are sold and a few are bartered. In a perfect
market with efficient prices, the price of
widgets throughout this combined market
should be the same for identical widgets,
regardless of whether the Widgets are traded
for money or for other goods and services.
However, because there are fewer trans
actions in the sub market for bartered Widgets
and fewer possible trading partners, the prices
of bartered Widgets can be very different from
those of widgets bought and sold for money.
A person offering Widgets in the barter sub·
market might get a lower exchange ratio
(lower price) than would be the case in the
monetary market. Similarly, someone
needing Widgets might pay a higher price than
in the regular market. In fact, it has been
reported that some business suppliers of
goods and services have vastly different prices
for their products, one price for the regular
market and another (much higher) for the
barter market.
There is no guarantee that the goods and
services that people want will be supplied
through the barter organization . Tremendous
imbalances can occur between supply and . 
mand within the barter submarket, and th
can allow transaction prices there to be co
siderably different from the true prices.
continued on page 7

